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Abstract
Security is becoming an important issue in the recent System on Chip (SoC) design due to various hardware attacks that can affect 
manufacturers, system designers or end users. Major issues include hardware Trojan attack, hardware intellectual property (IP) theft, 
such as an illegal sale or use of firm intellectual property cores or integrated circuits (ICs) and physical attacks. A hybrid model 
consisting of Arbiter PUF and Butterfly PUF are used to generate random responses which are fed to a Finite State Machine (FSM). A 
three-level FSM was designed to generate the signature correctly to authenticate IPs. The results were obtained with the help of three 
Intellectual Property (IP) cores – Zedboard OLED IP, ISCAS’89 s1423 Benchmark IP and a Full Adder IP. A 16-bit arbiter PUF and Butterfly 
PUF have been implemented on a 28nm FPGA. The average execution time to generate hardware signature for three IP cores was 
found to be 4.78 seconds (5 iterations) which is considerably low.
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1 Introduction
A system on a chip (SoC) combines the essential electronic 
circuits of various computer components onto a single die. 
An SoC can perform analog, digital or even mixed-sig-
nal operations. It mainly consists of a graphical process-
ing unit (GPU), a multi core central processing unit, and 
a system memory (RAM). SoC FPGA devices integrate 
both processor and FPGA architectures into a single sub-
strate. Therefore, they provide lower power, smaller board 
size, higher integration, and higher bandwidth communi-
cation between the processor and FPGA logic. They also 
contain different peripherals, a Field Programmable Gate 
Array, an on-chip memory, and different types of trans-
ceivers. The advantages of using FPGA in a design are 
considered to be lower non-recurring engineering costs, 
shorter time-to-market, and higher flexibility. These rea-
sons made FPGA a prevalent design platform for automo-
tive, aerospace and consumer electronics applications.
An IP core is a design block that is used for product 
development in reconfigurable devices like ASICS or 
FPGAs. Due to the elements of design reuse, IP cores are 
essential parts of the growing electronic design automa-
tion industry. Ideally, an IP [1] core should be inserted 
into any vendor technology or design methodology effort-
lessly. Universal Serial Bus (USB), Phase Locked Loops 
(PLLs), Digital to Analog converters, and AMBA inter-
faces are some of the examples of IP cores. It can be cate-
gorized into three – hard, firm and soft cores. Hard cores 
are physical indicators of the IP design. These are mainly 
used in plug and play applications. Hard cores are less 
flexible and portable compared to the other two types of 
cores.  Firm cores carry placement data that are configu-
rable to different applications which are like hard cores. 
Soft cores are made of logic gates with associated inter-
connections. They are even available as a file written in 
Hardware description language like VHDL or Verilog.
IP cores are licensed and distributed like software to a 
system developer. Protection against unlicensed usage is 
a serious threat to the IP vendors which enables cloning 
of IP cores [2, 3]. This threat is taken into consideration 
when designing future embedded systems. By using IP 
cores, speed of product delivery can be rapidly increased. 
This will boost the trade with IP cores. So, the IP ven-
dors need to address the issue of security against unli-
censed usage of IP cores. It can also be found that the area 
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and power overhead for additional security or reliability 
functions will decrease with increasing chip area. Hence 
a secure and reliable IP core is necessary for future sys-
tem development.
1.1 Hardware Signature
Modern design methodologies are based on reusable mod-
ules called IP cores. The modular nature, reduced sys-
tem complexity and improved development time are some 
of the advantages of a reuse-based design methodology. 
Violation of Intellectual Property (IP) rights of the reus-
able modules is one of the risks in this type of design 
methodology. A third-party IP core vendor can sell an 
IP core as their own without even knowing the internal 
architecture or implementation. This is due to the modu-
lar nature of IP cores which enables easy integration with 
other components. Hence the development of an intellec-
tual property protection (IPP) mechanisms is vital for the 
evolving reuse-based system design methodology. Several 
watermarking techniques for the protection of IP cores 
have been proposed in the previous years. One such pro-
tection scheme is to embed a digital signature or a hard-
ware signature in the IP core. This watermarking tech-
nique is applied at hardware description language (HDL) 
level. This signature is preserved throughout the process 
of synthesis, placement and routing.
In this paper, the hardware signature is generated using 
a hybrid PUF and FSM model. The generated signature is 
embedded in the external IP core [4]. During verification, 
the BPUF key is extracted from the signature and com-
pared with the inbuilt values in the FSM.
1.2 Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [5 - 8] are innova-
tive hardware primitives that are used in cryptographic 
applications like authentication or secret key generation. 
They are advantageous over existing digital storage mech-
anisms for several reasons:
• PUF hardware [9] is made of simple digital circuits 
consisting of gates and flip flops. This consumes less 
power and area compared to the memory solutions 
with antitamper facilities. 
• PUF is popular due to the absence of additional cryp-
tographic hardware like the secure hash algorithm 
(SHA) or an encryption algorithm involving public or 
private key.
• It is very difficult to perform a physical attack to 
extract the digital data present on the chip when the 
power is OFF. The chip must be powered on to store 
the ‘secret’ on a memory.
• It is hard to perform invasive attacks without modify-
ing the physical characteristics of a PUF.
• It is very difficult to reproduce a Non-Volatile Memory 
(NVM) based on PUF for secret key storage. 
The secret obtained from a PUF is extremely difficult to 
predict or extract due to the inherent randomness of a PUF. 
The two primary applications of PUFs are secure key genera-
tion and low-cost authentication. PUFs are broadly classified 
into two groups. These groups are described as strong PUF 
and weak PUF. Strong PUFs are mostly used for authentica-
tion [10] while weak PUFs are used for storing keys. In this 
project, we are using both weak and strong PUFs. We are 
using Butterfly PUF and Arbiter PUF in our hybrid model.
Arbiter PUF [11, 12] is a delay based PUF made of 
Multiplexers and a D Latch. The circuit shown in Fig. 1 
takes 16-bit input called ‘challenge’ and produces a 1-bit 
‘response’. The amount of delay between two paths is 
determined using Multiplexers with the help of input con-
trol bits. A pair of Multiplexers is controlled by the same 
input bit I[i] which work as switching box. If the input con-
trol bit is zero, the Multiplexers pass through the two delay 
lines. Else, the top and bottom signals are interchanged. 
In this way, the circuit can create a pair of delay paths for 
each input ‘I’. The output is evaluated by giving a rising 
signal to both the paths simultaneously. Due to the delay 
differences in two paths, the arbiter latch decides which 
signal is faster. The output is high or low depending on the 
speed of signal reaching data input (D) of latch.
A Butterfly PUF cell [13] is a cross-coupled circuit made 
of two D latches as shown in Fig. 2. The output is made to 
occupy any of the stable states by the circuit operation. It is 
very difficult to create a cross coupled ring using combina-
tional circuits. This led to the design of combinational ring 
using latches present in a FPGA matrix. There are two main 
signals in D latch called Preset (PRE) and Clear (CLR). The 
Fig. 1 Arbiter PUF
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preset signal turns the output ‘Q’ to high on a high input. The 
Clear signal turns the output ‘Q’ to low on a high input. The 
output ‘B’ can be captured when the Clock is high. The data 
is transferred to ‘Q’. Initially, the Preset and Clear signals are 
set to low. Excite signal is connected to the Clear of Latch 1 
and Preset of Latch 2. Clock signal of both Latches is set to 
high to simulate the operation of a combinational loop. The 
Excite signal is made high to start the PUF operation. This 
brings the circuit to a highly unstable point. The Excite sig-
nal is made low after a few clock cycles. This makes the PUF 
circuit to attain either one of the two possible stable states, 
high or low, on the output ‘Out’.
2 Review of Literature
Counterfeiting of IP cores is a growing concern on the 
global economy and it also questions the security of the 
critical infrastructure [14]. A very well-known impact 
of counterfeiting is product cloning. Overproduction of 
goods is another dangerous aspect which is less known to 
people. Flexibility of software and performance of hard-
ware are the two critical factors concentrated on reconfig-
urable computing. These advantages led to the increasing 
attention from the industry for Reconfigurable comput-
ing. In this section we discuss some of the important 
works related to this article YingjieLao [14] talks about 
designing a two-level FSM to address the problem of 
Intellectual Property (IP) protection. He proposes a two 
level FSM architecture which is capable of authenticating 
IPs and correct the PUF response bit errors occurring due 
to environmental disparities. The cost required for this 
approach is very less compared to the conventional error 
correcting approaches (BCH codes) that are used previ-
ously for PUF based authentication.
A new IP protection mechanism to restrict the exe-
cution of IP core only on specific FPGA devices is being 
demonstrated by Jiliang Zhang [15]. It prevents the IP 
core from being reproduced. This mechanism enforces a 
pay-per-device licensing, which enables the system develop-
ers to purchase the IPs from the core vendors and the devel-
oper needs to pay only for the lease time. The unit price is 
lower compared to the normal expensive license fees. An 
Internet of Things architecture which facilitates run-time 
modifications to the hardware components is described by 
Anju P Johnson [16]. This Partially Reconfigurable FPGA 
architecture is inspired from the principles of hardware 
sharing and hardware mixing. This also allows on-line 
hardware updates which is used in enterprise IoT infrastruc-
tures sharing available resources. They evaluated the effec-
tiveness of different threats that can originate from the IoT 
nodes which use the dynamic partial reconfiguration. They 
also proposed a possible solution based on physical unclon-
able function (PUF) circuits to prevent such intimidations.
To protect and validate the IP in the design there are 
some existing techniques such as watermarking and finger-
printing. A recent method to embed watermarking [17] in 
soft IP core was proposed for embedded systems and it is a 
sequential aware one. The simulation results have been ana-
lyzed for Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA board. The main lim-
itation of this method is sequence length. Embed the water-
marks into a FPGA design at net list level by manipulating 
LUT. The watermark is embedded into LUTs at the net list 
level and fingerprint is inserted in the bit steam level to pro-
tect the IP reuse [18]. Mostly the IP protection techniques 
are started using PUF-FSM structure, because of its advan-
tages and security issues as mentioned in the related works. 
The IP protection based mechanism started using FSM 
based PUF for authenticating a device and IPs with data-
base. But in our work we have implemented a hardware sig-
nature which involves combination of two PUFs and FSM 
to protect specific IPs with less area, power utilization and 
communication overhead and no database.
3 Hardware Software Co-Design
Hardware/software (HW/SW) co-design is the concurrent 
development of both hardware and software sides of the sys-
tem. This type of design methodology helps in embedding 
together the modules on hardware and software to develop 
an optimized solution. This enables a system programmer 
to design hardware and software modules with ease.
The HW/SW co-design needs segregating the specifi-
cation into hardware and software. One part is implemen-
tation on hardware i.e., using hardware description lan-
guage in FPGA and other part run on software such as 
SDK using C. For these partitions the performance evalu-
ation is difficult. In order to achieve the above objective, 
Fig. 2 Butterfly PUF
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the hardware modules are mapped to compute-intensives 
parts of the application.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of HW/SW co-design that was 
used in this article. The specification of the system in terms 
of performance, functionality, cost and power is the initial 
step towards hardware-software co-design. Partitioning 
the application follows the initial step which is a very deci-
sion. The process of splitting the functions into hardware 
and software parts is termed as HW/SW partitioning. The 
profiling tools are used to analysis the heterogeneous appli-
cation and generates the information which helps the HW/
SW to take decision. After the decision of hardware, soft-
ware and the interface blocks, the style of coding and sim-
ulation is being finalized. In this step, the software and 
hardware specification are separated independently in the 
implementation process to optimize the overall specifica-
tion. This is succeeded by an important step called co-sim-
ulation. Validation of the system simulating the hardware 
and software development is undergone in this step. The 
co-simulation step provides the output, which is used to 
verify the achievement of design goals. The co-design 
flow will stop if the acceptance stage is reached. Else the 
design is not acceptable, which means some specification 
or design error has occurred. At this stage the Co- design 
will go to the previous steps where hardware and software 
have to be redesigned until an output that sounds a good 
design is attained. In the next step simulation-level imple-
mentation is achieved in hardware and software part, for 
which the results are obtained from the co-simulation step.
After the partitioning has been completed, the executable 
software and all the bit-stream generated files are linked 
together to create ”.elf” file that can be made to run on the 
target platform. For the experimental purpose, the Zedboard 
[19, 20] heterogeneous platform has been considered in this 
work. Zedboard is a Zynq evaluation development board 
for the designer interested in developing/testing designs. 
To enable a wide range of heterogeneous applications, the 
Zedboard includes all the necessary interfaces, commu-
nications and support functions. The most important part 
on this board is Xilinx Zynq 7000 All Programmable SoC 
(ZynqSoC os zynq board). ZynqSoC performs all com-
putational resources for the design system. Some con-
figuration has made computational resources, which is 
performed by ARM-based processing system (PS) and 
programmable logic (PL) based on Artix-7.
4 Proposed Design
The Flowchart described in Fig. 4 shows the different 
phases of our proposed hybrid model. Our hybrid model 
consists of two PUFs- Arbiter (APUF) and Butterfly 
(BPUF). The responses generated from two PUFs are 
given as input to the FSM. BPUF does not have an external 
challenge as input. ‘Excite’ signal shown in BPUF is con-
nected to the Enable pin of D-Latch present in the BPUF 
cell. This signal is used to trigger the output of BPUF. It 
is activated only once. Whereas for APUF, there exists a 
challenge Response Pair (CRP). It means for every chal-
lenge there exist a unique response.
In the next step, hamming distance is found between 
APUF challenge and Response pair (CRP). Hamming 
distance (HD) along with the BPUF key is given as input 
to the Finite State Machine (FSM). Based on the analy-
sis of Butterfly PUF, certain key values are fixed in FSM. 
Details of the FSM are described in detail in the next sec-
tion. When the corresponding match occurs with the val-
ues in the FSM, a hardware signature is generated. 
Fig. 3 HW/SW co-design overview of the design flow for ZynqSoC.
Fig. 4 Flow Chart
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The HD is calculated for CRP of APUF, where the strong 
PUF will generate a large set of CRPs. These CRPs have 
been tested by IP owners and the most frequent occurring 
HD have been selected for specific BPUFs KEY. These 
BPUF KEY is unique and used to generate key for specific 
devices by the device vendors. The HD is acting as a hash 
value for IP cores and KEY is used to authenticate the 
device. The combination of HD, Key and logical operation 
such as XOR and SHIFT will generate the hardware signa-
ture. This hardware signature is configured at the time of 
IP execution, which needs to be verified at that time of IP 
integration. This signature is attached to the configuration 
register inside the .elf file of the requesting IP core. If this 
signature is not authenticated in the initial stage of the IP 
booting step then it is not a valid or authentic IP.
4.1 Design of Finite State Machine
A three level Finite State Machine (3-l FSM) has been pro-
posed in this work. It is a three level design because the 
hardware signature is generated only after three stages. 
The signature is generated only if the hamming distance 
and BPUF key matches with the corresponding values in 
the FSM. Hamming distance (HD) is evaluated for 16- bit 
CRP of APUF which ranges from 0-15. To store this range 
only 4-bit is needed. The 4-bit HD is used in the first level 
of the FSM. A key value has been attached to correspond-
ing HD which is checked for the second stage.
The signature generation FSM has been given in the 
Fig. 5. This can be made even complex and it is up to the 
designer. An important thing that is to be noted is these val-
ues in FSM is subject to change for other SoC board. Hence 
the analysis has to be performed again to find and fix the 
values in FSM.
5 Implementation
Xilinx Zedboard, All Programmable SoC, were used to 
do this experiment [16]. Three IP Cores-OLED, s1423 
Benchmark IP and a Full Adder IP - were used in this 
design. The IP cores were selected using on board DIP 
switches and the status was displayed using the on board 
LEDs. The 32x128 pixels of OLED display panel is inbuilt 
on the Zedboard and is organized by the controller. The 
OLED controller will initialize the display panel based on 
the producer’s guidelines and specifications. The initial 
configuration is archived by sending gusts of commands 
as bytes which are separated by measured time intervals 
through a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI). Next step is to 
access the processing system (PS) in order to increase the 
performance. The OLED controller offers a PS access to the 
OLED display buffer through memory-mapped registers. 
There are seventeen registers of 32-bits each which can 
be accessed through soft wares. These software access 
register together form a slave AXI-peripheral of the con-
troller. In which 1 - 16 are data registers, while the 17th one 
is used for control. Any AXI-crossbar compliant proces-
sor system is connected to the OLED controller through 
AXI interface. The Zedboard OLED communicates with 
the display panel through SPI.
The benchmark circuits were used to evaluate the per-
formance of the algorithms used in the areas of fault sim-
ulation, testability analysis, formal verification, logic 
synthesis, technology mapping, and layout synthesis. The 
benchmark circuits disseminated to ISCAS’89 are all 
described as gate level netlist. The benchmark IP distrib-
uted in ISCAS’89, s1423, is one of the IP cores used in my 
design. It consists of 74 D-flip flops, 167 inverters, and 
490 gates. The gates are made of 197 ANDs, 64 NANDs, 
137 ORs, and 92 NORs. It takes 17-bit input and produces 
a 5-bit output.
Full Adder is the normal 3-bit adder producing sum and 
carries as output. There are three inputs and two outputs 
for a simple full adder. A and B are the first two inputs 
and C-IN is the third input carry. The C-OUT is the out-
put carry and usual output is SUM. The output carry is 
designated as C-OUT and the normal output is SUM. A 
cascade of adders can be generated using a full adder, 
which adds 8, 16, 32 etc. bit binary numbers
Fig . 5 FSM of the proposed Model
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6 Results and Discussion
Fig. 6 shows the diagram of the implemented design in 
Zedboard. The entire logic is implemented with the help 
of Look Up Tables (LUTs), Flip-Flops (FFs), Block RAM 
(BRAM) and BUFGs.
6.1 Utilization Details
Table 1 describes the resource utilization details of the 
design. The column ‘Available’ in Table 1 tells the amount 
of resources available in Artix-7 based ProgrammableLogic 
(PL) present in zedboard. The logic is implemented as 
LUTs, LUTRAMs, Flip Flops, BRAMs,  IOs and BUFGs.
6.2 Power Details
 Static power of the device is the power consumed due to 
transistor leakage on all connected voltage rails and the 
circuits required for the stable operation of FPGA during 
the post-configuration phase. This can be obtained by 
programming a blank bit-stream into the FPGA device. 
Design power is the power consumed by the user design 
mainly due to the input data and the internal activities of 
the circuit components. It depends on voltage levels and 
design logic. This power is varying for each clock cycle. It 
is also dependent on the routing resources used.
The main part of the design power is contributed for 
clock managers, the static current consumed by I/O pads 
and the circuits which consume power when required. 
Power taken by off-chip devices is not taken into consid-
eration while calculating design power.
Thermal power or total on-chip power is the power con-
sumed by the internal components of the FPGA. This is 
the sum of design power and static power consumed by 
the device. The On-Chip Power graph, as shown in Fig. 7, 
tells the power dissipated in different resources. It can be 
seen that the Processing System (PS7) contributes most to 
the total power (90 %). It can be found that the PL dynamic 
power is 16 mW and the device static power is 163 mW.
The area and power will vary based on the type of IPs 
and the embedded signature. The overhead incurred in the 
proposed model in terms of area and power is less com-
pared to the model without HS. The measured values are 
reported in the Fig. 8 with 3 different benchmark IPs.
6.3 PUF Analysis
The security metrics such as uniqueness, reliability, and 
randomness as referred in [21] are measured for a single 
32-bit PUF and hybrid PUFs which are described below 
and compared in Table 2. The security metrics of PUFs 
with the Eq. (1)-(3) and description are explained.
Table 1 Resource utilization details
Resource Utilization Available Utilization Percentage
LUT 3586 53200 6.74
LUTRAM 68 17400 0.39
FLIP FLOP 2988 106400 2.81
BLOCK RAM 0.5 140 0.36
IO 54 200 27
BUFG 1 32 3.13
Fig. 6 Implementation Design in Zedboard
Fig. 7 On-Chip Power
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The uncertainty in each bit is measured for L iterations, 
where ori, j is the j−th binary bit of an n−bit output response 
from a chip i.
While comparing with the individual PUFs, the hybrid 
PUF with FSM is better in terms of area, power, unique-
ness, and reliability. The proposed model is implemented 
in SoC FPGA, which is 28 nm with heterogeneous PUF 
hence, its power and area vary.
6.3.1 BPUF Response Analysis
The hardware generation module is executed for 10,000 
iterations, and a specific sample of 500 iterations has 
been selected for 4 different zynq boards, and its HD 
and KEY values are fixed, based on Fig. 9. The most 
frequently occurring HD and golden response of BPUF 
as KEY values have to be chosen in such a way that it 
is used only once and should be unpredictable. Fig. 9 
includes the call out or text for specific values which 
helps us to select the HD and golden response KEY with 
the most frequency. The KEY and HD are fixed to gen-
erate a unique hardware signature for specific board and 
IP modules respectively. In Fig. 9 each board will have 
three specific KEYs and HD, to generate hardware sig-
nature for a specific device and its selected IP modules.
It is based on these analyses the values are fixed in the 
Finite State Machine (FSM). Each key uniquely iden-
tifies IP cores for which the hardware signature has to 
be generated. In our design, a maximum of 8 IP cores 
can be incorporated. The number of IP cores that can be 
increased by changing the number of bits of Butterfly PUF 
from 8 bits to 32 bits or 64 bits.
The tabular column is shown below, Table 3, shows the 
KEYs, HDs and time required to generate the hardware 
signature for the three IP cores, which is tested in 4 Boards. 
It is to be noted that for the two iterations IPs are selected at 
random among the three. For board 3 the HD 9 is mapping 
to two unique BPUF KEYs, which indicates that the group 
of IPs can be authenticated using this method.
The time measurements are made in seconds. As 
described in the previous section, the signature generated 
is a 16-bit value. This is formed by the logical operation 
such as XORing the hamming distance and BPUF key 
Fig. 8 Area and Power Overhead with and without HS
Table 2 PUF based metrics comparison
Metrics Power (W)
Area 
(%)
Un 
(%)
Re
(%)
Ra 
(%)
A-PUFs 0.959 56.21 45.67 98.4 49.6
B-PUFs 0.098 55.39 36.23 91.86 30.45
Hybrid AB-PUFs 
and FSM 1.675 22.66 46.23 95.06 42.49
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followed by right shifting n- bits. The logical operation 
and n-bit shift may vary based on the designer. A specific 
verification technique is needed to extract the signature 
from the bit file and to authenticate an IP module.
7 Conclusion and Future work
A hybrid model has been proposed, which consists of 
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Finite State 
Machine (FSM) for an SoC architecture. It mainly 
addresses the issue of security in IP cores. The entire 
project is designed from the perspective of the IP vendor. 
The role of an IP vendor, like Synopsys, is to create and 
package design to an Intellectual Property (IP) core which 
is then given to a client through the network. The client 
uses this IP core in his design. So the vendor can incor-
porate this lightweight model in their design for overcom-
ing counterfeiting of IPs. One important advantage of our 
design is that it can be used in a heterogeneous environ-
ment. Our model is implemented and verified in Xilinx 
Zedboard. Our model uses Butterfly and Arbiter PUFs to 
generate random responses. BPUF response is termed as 
the key which uniquely identifies IP cores. Hamming dis-
tance between APUF challenge and response along with 
BPUF key is given as input to the FSM. The output of it 
is a flag variable which tells whether the signature is gen-
erated or not. If it is generated the signature is returned.
Table 3 Key, Hardware signature (HS) and Execution  
Time for 4 Zynq Boards
Board No: BPUF KEY HD HS Execution time (s)
1
DF34 11 37c9 2.52
CF7F 10 19ed 5.18
EFF6 9 077f 1.69
2
DF6F 11 37df 9.79
F7FD 10 1efd 0.99
EDF3 9 079f 7.56
3
DCFC 11 373b 8.53
ECBD 9 1d95 2.11
EFFF 9 07ef 3.36
4
FACB 11 3eb2 1.54
D8FE 10 1b1d 1.68
AF7F 9 057b 13.98
Fig. 9 BPUF Key and HD mapping for 4 independent zynq Boards
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The number of IP cores that can be attached to our 
design is limited to 8. This can be further improved by 
increasing the number of bits of PUFs to 64 or 128. The 
future works can be concentrated on implementing the 
same design in a networked environment. The developer 
can add Operating System and Networking functions to 
the design. As mentioned in the previous chapters BPUF 
is a weak PUF. So, this model can be improved by chang-
ing this to modern PUFs like Feed Forward Arbiter PUF 
or XOR-Arbiter PUF. This will enable a large number of 
IP cores to be incorporated in the design. An important 
feature provided by Xilinx called 'Partial Reconfiguration' 
can be used to reduce the area occupied and power con-
sumed. Partial Reconfiguration enables the device to 
dynamically modify the logic blocks by choosing the par-
tial bit files at run time.
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